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COPYRIGHT RULEMAKING: PAST AS PROLOGUE 
Joseph P. Liu† 
ABSTRACT 
In deciding what rulemaking authority the Copyright Office should have, it may be helpful 
to take a close and careful look at how the Office has historically exercised its rulemaking 
powers. This article undertakes this task and makes a number of observations: (1) the Office’s 
rulemaking activity increased dramatically after passage of the 1976 Act; (2) the rules issued 
fall into a number of identifiable categories; (3) by far the largest category consists of rules 
administering statutory licenses set forth in the Act; and (4) the smallest category consists of 
precisely the kinds of substantive rules that some commentators propose the Copyright Office 
issue in the future. While Congress may, of course, change the balance of copyright regulation 
in the future, this Article argues that any future delegations of substantive rulemaking authority 
must take into account the fact that the Office’s regulatory efforts to date have largely involved 
a very particular and unique kind of rulemaking, one that focuses on administering legislative 
compromises between large industries rather than on furthering specific copyright policies. 
Care must be taken to ensure that this unusual regulatory perspective does not unduly 
influence or affect future substantive rulemaking.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is probably fair to say that copyright rulemaking has not until recently 
been a subject of sustained or intense scholarly interest. Few, if any, copyright 
courses or casebooks spend any real time going through the regulations 
promulgated by the Copyright Office and the Librarian of Congress (which 
are found, for those who are wondering, at 37 C.F.R. §§ 200 and 300). Few 
scholarly articles take copyright rulemaking as their primary focus of study or 
analysis. Ask most copyright scholars or practitioners what their favorite 
copyright regulation is, and you are likely to draw a blank stare.  
To some extent it is easy to see why. The substantive law of copyright is 
found almost exclusively in the text of the Copyright Act and in the many 
federal judicial opinions interpreting and building upon that text. By contrast, 
very little substantive copyright law is found in the regulations. Unlike some 
other areas of federal law, Congress has not generally delegated to the 
Copyright Office the authority to promulgate substantive rules. 1  Instead, 
copyright regulations largely consist of technical or procedural rules 
surrounding registration, notice, deposit, and the administration of various 
complex industry-specific statutory licenses. Unless you happen to engage in 
one of these activities, you might never need to refer to copyright regulations 
at all. 
Yet this relative lack of interest in copyright rulemaking is changing. As the 
Copyright Act has grown more complex, more attention has been paid to the 
relative lack of substantive regulatory authority in this area, at least as 
compared to other areas of federal law. Commentators have begun to ask 
whether, as in other areas of federal law, granting greater substantive 
 
 1. In some cases, Congress has delegated rulemaking authority directly to the Copyright 
Office (typically subject to approval by the Librarian of Congress). In other cases, it has 
delegated the authority directly to the Librarian (subject to advice from the Copyright Office). 
Since in either case, the Copyright Office appears to be the primary locus of initial rulemaking 
competence (and to avoid unnecessary repetition), I will refer in this Article generally to 
rulemaking by the Copyright Office in both instances. 
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rulemaking authority to the Copyright Office might be warranted as a way of 
dealing with increased complexity and the dynamic nature of copyright and 
technology markets. 2  A number of commenters have proposed specific 
delegations of such authority, for example the authority to craft specific fair 
use exemptions or safe harbors.3 As movement builds towards a possible 
comprehensive redrafting of the Copyright Act, interest in this form of 
copyright lawmaking has increased.4 
In light of these developments, it may be helpful to take a closer look at 
the history and current state of copyright rulemaking. How has the Copyright 
Office historically exercised its regulatory authority? What do current 
copyright regulations look like? And what, if anything, does this tell us about 
the potential for future delegations of rulemaking authority? Although past 
experience need not dictate or limit what is possible in the future, since 
Congress can always decide to alter the scope of existing rulemaking authority, 
past rulemakings may highlight both risks and opportunities as we consider 
venturing into a brave new world of copyright rulemaking. 
II. RULEMAKING PAST AND PRESENT 
Prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act), 
copyright regulations were rather scant. Indeed, the Copyright Office itself was 
not created until 1897 as a separate federal department within the Library of 
Congress. Before 1897, specifically from 1870–1896, the Library of Congress 
itself administered the copyright registration system, and, before then, from 
1790–1869, copyrights were recorded in the U.S. District Courts. Throughout 
this period (essentially the first century of copyright law in the U.S.), the 
primary and almost exclusive administrative function in copyright involved 
registration and recordation of copyrights. 
This focus on registration is reflected in the very first sets of copyright 
regulations promulgated by the Copyright Office. The Copyright Act of 1909 
(the 1909 Act) expressly delegated to the Copyright Office the power, subject 
 
 2. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 148 (2004). 
 3. See id.; Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 398–99 
(2009); cf. Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007) (proposing 
fair use no-action letters). 
 4. Note that there are tricky and complex questions about whether the Copyright Office 
is constitutional or can constitutionally exercise such rulemaking authority. See, e.g., Andy Gass, 
Considering Copyright Rulemaking: The Constitutional Question, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1047 
(2012). Similarly, there are very interesting questions about whether the Copyright Office 
should ideally be placed under a different agency or be a freestanding agency. These questions 
are beyond the scope of this Article.  
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to approval by the Librarian of Congress, “to make rules and regulations for 
the registration of claims to copyright as provided by the Act.”5 The earliest 
codified version of those regulations appears in the very first version of the 
Code of Federal Regulations in 1938. Comprising 30 sections and 
approximately 6,500 words in total, the regulations focused almost exclusively 
on the procedures for registering copyrights.6 The size, scope, and nature of 
copyright regulations remained quite stable over the next 40 years until passage 
of the 1976 Act. Indeed, the 1977 version of the regulations, published shortly 
before the effective date of the 1976 Act, similarly focused almost exclusively 
on registration and weighed in at approximately 8,500 words. 
The relatively modest size and scope of copyright regulations radically 
changed after passage of the 1976 Act. Before describing this change, it is 
important to note that the 1976 Act itself represented a significant departure 
from the relatively more modest 1909 Act, in terms of size, scope, and 
complexity. Prior to passage of the 1976 Act, the Copyright Act weighed in at 
approximately 11,000 words. After the effective date of the Act, the Copyright 
Act nearly tripled in size, weighing in at approximately 30,000 words. Earlier 
work has analyzed this dramatic change in the statute and sought to explain 
the implications that flow from it.7  
  
 
 5. Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 53, 35 Stat. 1075, 1085 (repealed 1976). 
 6. A small portion of the regulations, Part 2, contained proclamations of copyright 
relations, dealing with copyright claims of authors from various foreign countries. 
 7. See Liu, supra note 2, at 129–66; David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 
UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1320 (2004). To a large (though not exclusive) extent, the increase was 
driven by complicated provisions dealing with statutory licenses for cable, satellite TV, and 
digital public performances of sound recordings. 
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Figure 1 
Historical Development of the 17 U.S.C. Word Count8 
 
Less recognized was a parallel, and even more dramatic, increase in the size 
and scope of copyright regulations. Immediately after passage of the 1976 Act, 
copyright regulations increased in size from approximately 8,500 words in 
1977 to nearly 40,000 words in 1978, essentially quadrupling in size and 
exceeding the size of the 1976 Act itself. Thus, by 1978, copyright regulations 
were more extensive, at least in terms of raw size, than the Copyright Act itself. 
The size gap between copyright statutes and copyright regulations has only 
increased since passage of the 1976 Act. While the size of the Copyright Act 
has increased dramatically since 1978, essentially tripling in size (to nearly 
100,000 words today), the size of copyright regulations has increased even 
more dramatically, weighing in at more than 200,000 words today.  
Thus, despite the relative lack of attention paid to copyright rulemaking, 
the sum of that rulemaking dwarfs the size of the underlying statute. There is 
 
 8. Approximate word counts for the Copyright Act were derived by importing the text 
of the Copyright Act at various points in time into Microsoft Word, deleting any words that 
were not part of the Act itself, and using the word count tool to calculate the total number of 
words. Sources of statutory text include the following: 1790 Act; 1831 Act (4 Stat. 436); 1909 
Act (35 Stat. 1075); Title 17 as of 1976, 1994, 2000 (Heinonline.org); Title 17 as of 1978 (90 
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far more copyright “law” (defined in terms of raw word count) in the 
regulations than in the Copyright Act itself. 
Figure 2 
17 U.S.C. and 37 C.F.R. §§ 200 and 300 Word Count Development9 
 
Of course, bare word counts tell us very little about the nature, importance, 
or significance of the Copyright Office’s regulatory output. We know that 
there are a lot of copyright regulations, but what do these regulations consist 
of? While acknowledging that categorizations are somewhat arbitrary, 
copyright regulations can broadly be broken down into five different 
categories: 
Administrative/ministerial regulations. These regulations deal with basic agency 
procedures, such as how to contact the agency, how to serve legal process, 
how to handle Freedom of Information Act requests, privacy policies, etc. 
 
 9. Approximate word counts for Copyright regulations were derived by importing the 
text of 37 C.F.R. §§ 200 and 300 at various points in time into Microsoft Word, deleting any 
words that were not part of the regulations, and using the word count tool to calculate the 
total number of words. Sources of text for the C.F.R. at various points in time were taken 
from Heinonline.org, which provides full text versions of the C.F.R. at various points in time 
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These are regulations that are not unique to the copyright system, but rather 
arise from the basic functions of an agency.10 
Registration, deposit, notice regulations. These regulations deal with the historic 
functions of the Copyright Office, e.g., the process and fees for applying for 
registration, deposit requirements, form and placement of copyright notice, 
etc. This category made up most of the pre-1976 Act regulations.11 
Specific statutory provisions or exemptions. These are regulations for 
administering specific provisions in the Copyright Act, typically involving 
exceptions, where Congress has expressly delegated to the Office a role in 
managing the particular provision, e.g., receiving notices of objection to certain 
non-commercial performances of literary or musical works,12 specifying the 
content of copyright warnings posted by libraries and archives,13 etc. 
Statutory license regulations. These are regulations for administering the 
various statutory licenses in the Copyright Act for cable television, satellite 
television, digital public performances, the mechanical license, the Audio 
Home Recording Act, etc. These highly complex and detailed provisions 
include reporting requirements, verification of statements of account, etc., as 
well as the results of periodic adjustments to the statutory royalty rates.14  
Substantive regulations. These are regulations that create substantive 
copyright law pursuant to an express delegation of authority by Congress to 
issue such regulations after notice and comment. The primary example of this 
is the triennial § 1201 rulemaking for identifying classes of works exempted 
from the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act.15 
As mentioned above, this is a rough and somewhat arbitrary 
categorization, and one could break down the regulations into different 
categories, or into more specific subcategories. In addition, some provisions 
straddle multiple categories, and placing such provisions in one or another 
category may be somewhat arbitrary. That said, the categorization provides us 
 
 10. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. §§ 203.1–205.23 (2016) (FOIA requests, privacy act compliance, 
and legal process).  
 11. See, e.g., id. §§ 201.1–201.3 (general provisions, fees, registration, recordation); id. 
§ 202 (preregistration). Note that this category includes regulations dealing with termination 
of transfers, since these are related to the recordation function of the Office, although they 
could also be placed in the next category. Id. § 201.10. Note also that included in this category 
are provisions for the registration of mask works (§ 211) and boat hulls (§ 212), even though 
these are not, strictly speaking, copyright registrations.  
 12. Id. § 201.13. 
 13. Id. § 201.14. 
 14. See, e.g., id. §§ 210, 253.1–253.11. 
 15. Id. § 201.40. 
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with a quick snapshot of the existing regulatory output of the Copyright 
Office. 
Under the categorization scheme above, by far the largest category of 
regulations consists of the provisions administering the various statutory 
licenses.16 These regulations currently represent approximately 64% of the total 
size of copyright regulations. A number of these regulations are specific to a 
particular statutory license, whereas others apply to the statutory license system 
more generally. These are extensive and extremely complex regulations dealing 
with all of the many details surrounding the licenses, such as eligibility for 
licenses, reporting requirements, filing statements of account, proceedings 
before the Copyright Royalty Board, royalty rate revision proceedings, royalty 
distribution procedures, etc. 
The next largest category consists of regulations involving registration, 
deposit, notice, and other traditional Office functions, making up 
approximately 28% of the total word count. As noted above, these and similar 
provisions made up the bulk of the regulations prior to passage of the 1976 
Act.  
At the other end of the spectrum, the smallest category consists of 
substantive copyright regulations promulgated by the Librarian of Congress 
after notice and comment, accounting for just about 1% of the total regulatory 
word count. This category consists of a single section, 37 C.F.R. § 201.40, 
which lists the categories of works exempted from anticircumvention liability 
under 17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
  
 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2012) (secondary transmission for cable systems); § 112 (ephemeral 
recordings); § 114 (performance of sound recordings by digital audio transmission); § 115 
(making and distributing phonorecords); § 119 (secondary transmissions for satellite carriers); 
§ 122 (secondary transmissions for satellite carriers for local retransmissions); § 1003 (digital 
audio recording devices and media). 
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Figure 3 
37 C.F.R. §§ 200 and 300 Word Count Breakdown 
III. OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
So what observations or conclusions, if any, can we draw from the simple 
descriptive analysis above? Initially, of course, we should be cautious about 
drawing too many conclusions from simple word counts and basic descriptive 
analysis. Word counts are an imperfect proxy for importance, significance, or 
regulatory effort. That said, the descriptive account does offer a picture of the 
current regulatory output of the Copyright Office, and there are a number of 
observations we can make. 
First, copyright rulemaking has evolved significantly over time. Copyright 
rulemaking effectively began after passage of the 1909 Act, and for the first 70 
years almost exclusively consisted of relatively modest procedural and 
technical regulations dealing with the traditional Copyright Office functions of 
registration, deposit, notice, etc. After passage of the 1976 Act, however, 
copyright rulemaking increasingly dealt with management of the complex 
statutory licenses created by Congress in the 1976 Act and subsequent 
amendments. Although these regulations intervened more directly in the 
structure of certain markets, they were still largely aimed at implementing 
substantive statutory provisions enacted by Congress. Finally, and most 
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authority to the Copyright Office under § 1201.17 The story is thus one of not 
only increasing regulatory authority, but a dramatic shift in the nature of that 
authority, as Congress has entrusted the Copyright Office with greater 
authority over copyright policy. 
Second, it is worth observing that certain other kinds of regulations are 
missing from the Copyright Office’s regulatory output, at least as it is found in 
37 C.F.R. In particular, the Copyright Office does not generally issue the kinds 
of interpretive regulations that other agencies sometimes issue. The one 
exception is in the area of registration, where some regulations do expressly 
interpret the provisions in the Copyright Act dealing with originality and 
fixation.18 In addition, the Copyright Office’s Compendium of U.S. Copyright 
Office Practices19 contains a significant amount of interpretive guidance on 
these same subjects. The Compendium is not expressly a regulation issued by 
the Office, but rather a manual that “provides expert guidance to copyright 
applicants, practitioners, scholars, the courts, and members of the general 
public regarding institutional practices and related principles of law.”20 While 
the interpretations in the Compendium are not entitled to Chevron21 deference, 
courts may consider and weigh them to the extent they are persuasive. 22 
Similarly, the Office has for some time issued studies and reports on various 
aspects of copyright law, in its capacity as an advisor to Congress on copyright 
legislation. However, regulations containing interpretive guidance do not make 
up a substantial portion of the Copyright Office’s regulatory output. 
Third, it is interesting to note the dominance of the statutory licensing 
provisions, and the comparatively small size of substantive rulemaking, in the 
overall regulatory output of the Copyright Office. Copyright regulations 
primarily concern statutory licensing and traditional registration functions. 
Only a minuscule portion of the Office’s current regulatory output consists of 
substantive copyright regulation. This is not to say that the substantive 
 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). See Liu, supra note 2, at 98, 110–12 (describing and 
analyzing this trend). 
 18. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2016) (“Material not subject to copyright.”). 
 19. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 
(3d ed. 2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/ [https://perma.cc/C9ZK-AXT8]. 
 20. See id. at 1; see also 37 C.F.R. § 201.2(b)(7). 
 21. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (holding that where statute is ambiguous, courts should defer to agency’s reasonable 
interpretation). 
 22. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (agency interpretations of 
statute may be followed if sufficiently persuasive). Note that there is a generally unsettled 
question regarding what kind of deference Copyright Office interpretations are due in its 
registration determinations. See Dan Burk, DNA Copyright in the Administrative State, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1297, 1301 (2018).  
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regulations are unimportant, or that they require comparatively little effort to 
promulgate. Indeed, because these provisions, unlike some of the other 
regulations, require notice and comment and must be re-promulgated every 
three years, they occupy significant agency resources.23 That said, the relatively 
small size and recent provenance of this kind of regulatory activity are 
interesting to note, given that many proposals suggest expanding upon 
precisely this category of rulemaking. 
With respect to this last observation, it is worth considering how the 
dominance of statutory licensing in the Office’s current regulatory output 
might affect how we think about copyright regulation in the future. On the 
one hand, just because an agency has undertaken certain forms of rulemaking 
in the past does not mean that it must continue to do so in the future. After 
all, Congress can always alter the mix of regulations that the Office 
promulgates. At the same time, as we think about what role copyright 
rulemaking might play in the future, it is important to acknowledge that we do 
not write on a blank slate or a blank agency. Accordingly, it is worth asking 
how the Office’s existing regulatory output might affect, influence, or limit 
what we ask it to do in the future. 
In particular, how might the existing regulatory activity of an agency shape 
its priorities, its worldview, and its capabilities? For example, a Copyright 
Office focused exclusively on registering copyrights (as was the case for many 
decades) might have a certain outlook or perspective. Its primary responsibility 
would be to ensure that copyright claims are properly registered and recorded, 
that the records are easily searched, and that information about copyright 
entitlements is made available for purposes of licensing. The primary 
constituencies might be the authors, publishers, and others who wish to license 
or use copyrights. The substantive copyright doctrines of most concern might 
be those dealing with validity, e.g., originality and fixation, as well as 
formalities, and less (if at all) with doctrines outside of registration, such as 
infringement and fair use. The model here is of an agency as a recorder of 
claims and a facilitator of transactions. 
By contrast, a Copyright Office focused extensively on managing and 
administering various statutory licenses might have a different perspective or 
orientation. Such an Office would, like the Office mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, be focused on facilitating transactions. But unlike the Office in the 
previous paragraph, such an Office would not be facilitating transactions 
struck in the market, but transactions struck through the legislative process 
and enacted into law. Such an Office might be engaged more deeply in the 
structure of the particular industries subject to statutory licensing (e.g., cable 
 
 23. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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television, satellite television, recorded music, etc.), and indeed might be 
particularly sensitized to the interests of such industries. The model here would 
be of an agency as an administrator of industry agreements and settlements. 
Finally, a Copyright Office focused extensively on promulgating 
substantive copyright regulations might have yet another outlook or 
perspective. For example, imagine the Copyright Office were given significant 
substantive regulatory authority, like some other federal agencies, to 
promulgate broad exceptions to copyright liability or issue broad substantive 
and binding regulations regarding copyrightability. Imagine the Office were 
delegated such authority by Congress in furtherance of a specific statutory 
policy such as ensuring broad public access to copyrighted works. Such an 
Office might view its constituency differently and might be more focused on 
a particular normative policy goal, rather than simply on facilitating market 
transactions or administering a statutory license. The model here would be of 
an agency as promoter of a particular substantive policy or set of policies.24 
Of course, the Copyright Office currently engages in all of the above 
activities and thus reflects all of these different perspectives and orientations, 
is responsive to many different constituencies, and pursues many different 
(and sometimes inconsistent) policies. Yet the point is that it may not engage 
in all of these activities in equal degree. To the extent that certain activities, 
such as the Copyright Office’s rulemaking activities, reflect a particular 
distribution of such concerns, such a distribution might affect how it issues 
regulations in the future. More specifically, the overwhelming dominance of 
statutory licensing, and the relatively smaller size of substantive rulemaking, 
should inform future delegations of rulemaking authority. 
One implication of the current distribution of regulatory output is that, as 
we consider delegating more rulemaking authority to the Copyright Office, we 
should keep conceptually distinct the different kinds of rulemaking the Office 
has engaged in in the past. For example, if Congress were to delegate more 
and broader substantive rulemaking authority to the Office, it should ensure 
that the authority is accompanied by a clearly articulated policy goal or 
statement of purpose.25 This would signal clearly that the operative model of 
agency action is the agency as promoter of substantive policy, rather than as 
facilitator of transactions or settler of industry disagreement. The role is not to 
broker agreement, but to further a normative policy. 
 
 24. Cf. Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010) (exploring agency institutional design features as a way of reducing the 
risk of industry capture). 
 25. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (specifying the criteria that the Librarian of 
Congress must apply in exempting categories of works from anticircumvention liability). 
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The crafting of copyright exceptions highlights the potential dangers of 
confusion as to role. If the Copyright Office were given the power to 
promulgate exceptions to copyright liability (as some commentators have 
proposed),26 the Copyright Office could adopt two very different perspectives: 
exceptions as furthering a normative copyright policy, or exceptions as a 
compromise between the interests of competing groups. Under the former 
perspective, the Office would take comments, undertake studies, and apply its 
own expertise to determine exceptions that in its view best further the 
normative policy.27 Under the latter perspective, the Office would convene 
industry groups, facilitate negotiations, and endorse exceptions that reflect 
compromise between the interests of the parties. As with legislation, the line 
between policy and compromise may not be a clear one, and the interests of 
various parties will be considered in either case. Yet the orientation or 
emphasis adopted by the agency may make a real difference in the kinds of 
regulations promulgated.28 
Some past discussions of exceptions have reflected a kind of “dispute 
resolution” perspective. For example, in the run-up to passage of the 1976 Act, 
there was much disagreement about the proper scope of a photocopying 
privilege for in-class educational uses. Various interested groups gathered to 
negotiate and agree upon certain guidelines for such uses, which were 
eventually incorporated into the legislative history of the Act, though they 
appeared nowhere in the Act itself.29 More recently, the Copyright Office has 
helped convene interested groups to discuss potential revision of 17 U.S.C. 
§ 108 exceptions for libraries and archives, in light of the vast changes in 
technology since passage of the Act. Such discussions might be viewed as 
helping to inform a particular normative policy or as dictating the terms of a 
compromise between industry groups, or, of course, a bit of both.30 
The experience with the § 1201 rulemaking provides yet another 
illustration of the importance of clarity as to role. Congress delegated to the 
 
 26. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 2, at 148; Mazzone, supra note 3, at 399.  
 27. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 
(2009) (identifying clusters of policy justifications for fair use in the existing case law). 
 28. Note that even in the absence of substantive regulatory authority, the Office has 
done something arguably similar in recent years when issuing advisory reports on substantive 
copyright policy issues—e.g., ISP safe harbors, orphan works, mass digitization—after issuing 
a notice of inquiry soliciting input and comments from various stakeholders. Although the 
final product is a publication rather than substantive regulation, the process resembles in some 
ways the process of notice and comment for rulemaking. 
 29. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66–67, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680; see Jennifer 
E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1918–19 
(2007). 
 30. See generally Rothman, supra note 29. 
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Librarian of Congress the authority to exempt certain classes of works from 
anticircumvention liability. In so doing, Congress articulated a normative 
standard—whether technological protection measures “adversely affect[]” the 
ability of persons to engage in noninfringing uses—and set forth a list of 
factors the Librarian was to consider in making that substantive 
determination. 31  Thus, Congress clearly signaled the desire to pursue a 
substantive policy goal. Notably absent, at least expressly, was any 
consideration of compromise between various interests. Initially, the Librarian 
took a relatively limited view of its regulatory authority, but it has expanded 
that authority somewhat in subsequent rulemakings, reflecting a greater 
comfort with the delegation of substantive authority. 
Closely related to the concern about the perspective the Office adopts 
when issuing regulations is a concern about the resources and particular 
competences of the Office. The vast majority of the Office’s current resources 
are focused on registration and the administration of the statutory licenses. By 
contrast, Office resources devoted to policy analysis (whether legal, economic, 
or technological) are comparatively limited. This distribution of resources 
made sense in a world where the Office’s primary administrative 
responsibilities focused on registration and the statutory licenses. However, if 
the agency is to be given expanded substantive regulatory authority going 
forward, it must also be equipped with the resources and expertise necessary 
to properly exercise that authority. These concerns have been raised elsewhere, 
but are worth repeating here.32 
Finally, any delegation of additional substantive regulatory authority to the 
Copyright Office must grapple with the broader concern about industry 
capture. This is a particular concern in areas like copyright law, where focused 
interests have much to gain by lobbying for protection, while the public 
interest is diffuse and has a more difficult time organizing itself in opposition.33 
Even if the Copyright Office were given the resources and expertise to fulfill 
a broader regulatory role, a real concern exists that the exercise of such power 
could be skewed in favor of private interests at the expense of the broader 
public interest.  
To some extent, the concerns expressed in this Article exist whether or 
not industry capture exists. Even in the absence of any evidence of capture, 
the Office’s existing regulatory authority and output could shape its 
 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2012). 
 32. See Liu, supra note 2, at 156–58; Aaron Perzanowski, The Limits of Copyright Expertise, 
33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 735 (2018). 
 33. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857, 870–79 (1987). 
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experience, orientation, and expertise. That said, such concerns would, of 
course, be exacerbated in an environment where industry capture was a real 
risk. Thus, steps should be taken to reduce the risk of capture and ensure that 
any exercise of additional regulatory authority be informed by a concern about 
the public interest.34 This is an important issue that is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the end, this Article argues that, as we consider delegating more 
rulemaking authority to the Copyright Office, we must take seriously the 
history of copyright rulemaking and the peculiar path-dependence of that 
rulemaking to date. We do not write on a blank slate or a blank agency. Over 
the past century, the Office has developed its own expertise and perspective, 
and as we consider conferring more substantive rulemaking authority on the 
Office, we must think carefully about how that expertise and perspective will 
affect future exercises of regulatory authority. 
  
 
 34. See Barkow, supra note 24, at 17, 19 (suggesting that policy makers should avoid 
“prioritizing narrow short-term interests at the expense of long-term public welfare”). 
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